

**Corrigendum for Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan. 2009. "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(4): 570-597.\***

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We have been alerted to an error in the way that the data for the original published article was set up for survival analysis in Stata, leading to an incorrect specification of the hazard function in the reported Cox analysis.

The three authors on the original paper (i.e., Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan) sincerely apologize for this error – for which Kristian Skrede Gleditsch is solely responsible – and we are grateful to Michael Ryan Tiernay for alerting us to this.

We have revised the replication archive to include a new file with the data revised with the correct setup. In this memo we report the results with the revised data with the corrected setup and provide a brief summary of the implications for the discussion in the published article.

To recap, in the original article we presented three hypotheses on conflict termination tested by the hazard rates for different covariates (p. 577), namely:

Hypothesis 1: Conflicts between governments and strong rebels will be shorter.

Hypothesis 2: Conflicts between governments and rebels that control territory in the periphery will be longer.

Hypothesis 3: Conflicts will be shorter when the rebels have greater opportunities to substitute

Table 3 displays the revised results for using the disaggregated measures of rebel strength, while Table 4 displays the revised results using the aggregate measure of the strength of rebels relative to the government. Although the signs of the coefficients in general do not change with the revised data with the corrected setup, the changes in the coefficients and estimated standard errors imply some differences with regards to significance tests.

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Table 3: Results based on the corrected data

Variable	Coef	SE
Territorial control	-0.309**	0.133
Strong central command	0.279**	0.140
High mobilization capacity	0.245	0.175
High arms procurement capacity	0.326	0.350
High fighting capacity	0.339	0.254
Legal political wing	0.530**	0.176
War on core territory	-0.511**	0.270
Coup d'etat	2.044**	0.306
ELF index	0.379	0.266
Ethnic conflict	0.038	0.157
Ln GDP per capita	0.048	0.076
Democracy	-0.743**	0.186
Two or more dyads	-0.475**	0.125
Ln population	-0.078**	0.050

N = 2426

Wald chi2(14) = 187.98

Log pseudolikelihood = -1731.25

Note: \*\* indicates estimates statistically significant at 0.05 level in a one tailed test

In our originally published article, we argued that “all of the indicators of strong nonstate actors in model 1 increase the hazard rate, or make it more likely that a conflict will end when rebels can pose a serious challenge to a government”, and although not all of the coefficients are “significant at conventional levels, we see these results as providing considerable evidence in support of hypothesis 1, that insurgents with stronger military capabilities tend to be associated with shorter conflicts.” This statement can still stand, although mobilization capacity and fighting capacity are no longer statistically significant while strong central command now is.

The conclusions regarding hypotheses 2 and 3 remain unchanged, i.e., conflicts are less likely to end when rebels have territorial control, and they are more likely to end when rebels have a legal political wing.

Table 4: Results based on the corrected data

Variable	Coef	SE
Territorial control	-0.368**	0.143
Rebels stronger	0.899**	0.226
Rebels at parity	0.532**	0.182
Legal political wing	0.523**	0.179
War on core territory	-0.567**	0.266
Coup d'etat	2.064**	0.293
ELF index	0.295	0.267
Ethnic conflict	0.076	0.155
Ln GDP per capita	0.068	0.075
Democracy	-0.762**	0.191
Two or more dyads	-0.456**	0.126
Ln population	-0.048	0.050

N = 2426

Wald chi2(12) = 169.42

Log pseudolikelihood = -1729.26

Note: \*\* indicates estimates statistically significant at 0.05 level in a one tailed test

Some of the conclusions regarding the control variables change when the data are corrected, and we have tried to identify all incorrect statements in the originally published article below.

*Although the coefficient estimates for strong central control and high fighting capacity are not significant at conventional levels, we see these results as providing considerable evidence in support of hypothesis 1, that insurgents with stronger military capabilities tend to be associated with shorter conflicts (p. 586).*

This statement is no longer correct, since strong central command is now significant.

*Civil wars appear to last longer in countries with higher populations and with lower incomes (p. 587).*

Although the sign of these coefficients remain the same with the corrected data, neither of these coefficients are now statistically significant.